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One of the key obstacles to a swift agreement on how to reform the EU institutions is the belated insistence 
of Poland to reopen the issue of voting weights in the Council. The system unanimously agreed in the 
Constitutional Treaty (CT) foresaw a double majority system under which a (qualified) majority requires 
two elements: at least 55% of the member states accounting for at least 65% of the EU’s population.  
In 2004, the then Polish government had agreed, under considerable pressure, to this double majority 
formula.  The new Polish government has for some time now insisted that this issue should be reconsidered.  
Initially it proposed that instead of the double majority the so-called ‘Penrose’, or square root formula 
should be used under which only one majority would be required, namely one calculated using the square 
root of member states’ populations. Recently, however, the Polish government has changed its stance and is 
now ready to accept the principle of a double majority approach, but one in which the second majority 
element would not be based on a majority of the population, but rather on the square root of the population.   
It is widely assumed that the insistence of the Polish government on the square root approach is 
motivated by the desire to increase its voting power. Our figures show, however, that this will not be 
necessarily the case. Poland is in general unlikely to gain a lot from the square root approach because it 
is a ‘nearly-big’ member state: 21 member states are smaller than Poland, and only 5 are larger. Any 
formula that gives more (relative) weight to smaller member countries is thus likely to affect Poland in 
a similar way as the other large member countries. 
It might be that the Polish government is not so much concerned about its voting weight in general, but 
its weight in relation to the largest member state(s). In particular the Polish government might assume 
that in general it is more likely to find itself in a coalition with smaller member states. However, this 
does not seem to be the case in reality. Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) show that since May 
2004, the four countries that were closest in their voting pattern to Poland were Germany, Belgium, 
Greece and Italy, i.e. two large and two small countries. It is thus difficult to understand the insistence 
of the Polish government on the square root approach. 
In discussing voting rules, one has to distinguish clearly between the way votes are weighted relative to 
each other, for example by using the square root, and the thresholds that define a qualified majority. 
The former is a zero-sum game among member states, whereas the latter has important implications for 
the decision-making capacity of the EU. Unfortunately, it is not altogether clear what the Polish 
government is proposing concerning the threshold for the required majority among member states. Two 
options, however, are implied by Poland’s proposal: keep the threshold for member states at 55% or 
  1lower it to 50%. Our research shows that the differences between these two variants of the square root 
approach are minor. 
We can thus concentrate on the general question: would the square root approach lead to different 
majorities?   
In other words, how likely is it that the square root formula would actually make a difference? That is, in 
how many cases would a blocking minority under the CT not constitute a blocking minority under the 
square root formula? There are two ways to provide a tentative answer to this question: 
A first shot at answering this question can be obtained by assuming (as is done in the calculations for the 
passage probabilities) that voting is random. One can then take all possible coalitions that would constitute 
a qualified majority under the CT and check whether they would also have been a qualified majority under 
the square root formula. Mika Widgren has calculated that in somewhat less than 10% of all cases would 
that difference arise (i.e. QM under one rule, but not under the other). Since only about 13% of all possible 
combinations would yield a qualified majority (this is called the ‘passage probability’), this implies that the 
square root formula would make a difference in about 1.1-1.3% of all cases (i.e. among all random 
legislative proposals). 
A second way to approach this issue would be to look at experience: i.e. in how many cases would the 
square root formula have made a difference in reality given the actual voting patterns one can observe since 
enlargement? The data show that the Council in reality rarely votes (less than 25% of all legislation is 
passed with a proper vote). Moreover, the vast majority of opposing formations that remain in a minority 
consist of only one to three Council members. The square root formula would make a difference only for 
coalitions of at least four member states, since the CT stipulates that this is the minimum size for a blocking 
minority.
1
The table below shows that there were only 20 cases (5.5% of all legislative action) in a two and a half year 
period following enlargement in which a contesting group of countries was overruled, although opposing  
minority comprised four member countries or more. It appears that in only a handful of cases would the 
outcome have been different if the CT or the square root formula had been applied, and this over a period of 
more than two years.  
 
Overview of opposing minorities to adopted legislation, May 2004-December 2006 
Size of opposing 
minority  Number of cases  % of contested cases 
% of total legislative 
action 
1 31  30.7  8.6 
2 38  37.6  10.6 
3 12  11.9  3.3 
4 9  8.9  2.5 
5 7  6.9  1.9 
6 1  1.0  0.3 
7 3  3.0  0.8 
Source: Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse (2007). 
 
 
All in all, our research suggests that the results of the square root approach (in both variants) would not in 
reality be that much different from the CT. A simple compromise might thus be the following: the new 
                                                 
1 Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) also show that one cannot detect a trend since enlargement towards more open 
contestations (voting), but the frequency of another form of opposition, namely the issuing of ‘formal statements’ has 
increased.  
 
  2Treaty adopts the double majority with the 55/65 thresholds agreed in the CT. But in addition the new 
Treaty would also contain a clause that permitted any member state to request a recalculation of the votes 
according to the square root formula. If the results were different, the proposal would not be adopted 
immediately. The Council might have to re-convene after some time and confirm the decision a second 
time. This back-up clause would be temporary, however and would expire if it had been invoked only rarely 
in the course of a specified number of years. The efficiency and transparency of the decision-making 
process would thus be preserved, and the Polish government could also claim victory. 
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